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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 920186-CA 
vs. : 
: Oral Argument 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, : Priority No. 3 
Defendant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal seeks review of an Order denying Appellant 
Steven Stilling1s (hereinafter "Stilling") Motion to Withdraw his 
Guilty Pleas. Stilling filed a Notice of Appeal on March 17, 1992. 
Stilling is currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. This 
court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-3 (2) 
(1953 as amended). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) May the state rectify at a later hearing the 
insufficiency in the taking of guilty pleas in order to overcome 
the substantial lack of compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, where the insufficiency is the failure to 
establish the factual basis for the taking of the guilty pleas? A 
correctness standard is applied to the district courtfs ruling, 
pursuant to Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc., v. Dixie Power and 
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Water, Inc., 789 P. 2d 24 (Utah 1990) . Authority supporting 
Stilling1s position that such supplementation is error: United 
States of America v. Keiswetter, 866 F. 2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1989). 
(2) If supplementation of the record of the taking of 
the guilty pleas is permitted in this circumstance, was it error to 
use the affidavit of Stillingfs own lawyer to fill the void? A 
similar correctness standard. §78-24-8 (2), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), Rules 1.6 and 1.9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar. 
(3) Did the court therefore err in failing to permit the 
withdrawal of pre-Gibbons guilty pleas that at the time of their 
taking were not in substantial compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure? A similar correctness standard. 
Authority for Stilling*s claim of error: Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238 (1969), Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), McCarthy 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), State v. Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1991), 
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983) , North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), United States of America v. Keiswetter, 
866 F. 2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1989). 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Any determinative statutes will be cited in the body of 
the brief. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the lower court's denial of 
Stillingfs Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Pleas, which was initially 
filed as a Petition for a Post Conviction Relief to Set Aside 
Guilty Plea. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW. 
1. On February 13, 1985, Stilling pled guilty to three 
counts of robbery before the Hon. Ronald 0. Hyde and was committed 
to the Utah State Prison for three indeterminate terms of one to 
fifteen years, to run concurrently. 
2. On August 28, 1990, Stilling filed in the Second 
District Court a pro-se Petition for Post Conviction Relief to Set 
Aside Guilty Plea. (Addendum A.) 
3. Counsel from the Weber County Public Defender's 
Office was appointed. The State filed a Motion to Dismiss and 
Stilling, through counsel, filed a Motion to Amend the Petition. 
Stilling was given additional time to amend his petition to avoid 
its dismissal. Based upon an Affidavit of Bias, Judge Hyde recused 
himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Roth. 
4. An Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a 
supporting brief were filed pro-se by Stilling on November 30, 
1990. 
5. Hearings were held on February 13 and April 24, 
1991. 
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6. Additional memoranda were submitted after the 
hearings by Stilling pro-se, by his counsel Martin Gravis, and by 
the state, which attached to its memorandum supporting its motion 
to dismiss an affidavit voluntarily prepared on behalf of the state 
by Stilling1s trial counsel, Bernie Allen, which described 
confidential communications he had had with his client and which 
persuaded Mr. Allen that Stilling well understood what the facts 
and the evidence were alleged to be. Allen also reported his 
assessment of Stilling!s mental capabilities and Stilling's demands 
for numerous attorney-client meetings, the contents of which were 
disclosed in the affidavit. Allen also disclosed in his affidavit 
Stilling1s active participation in the wording of the Expiation 
Agreement. At the end of the affidavit Allen wished Stilling "the 
best of absolute luck in his future.11 (R. 97-102) A copy of Bernie 
Allen's affidavit is attached as Addendum B.) 
7. Stilling1s counsel moved to quash the affidavit of 
Bernie Allen as a violation of attorney-client privilege and 
Stillingfs right to cross-examine Allen. 
8. The court denied the motion to quash. 
9. In August 1991 Mr. Gravis withdrew as counsel and 
the undersigned entered her appearance. 
10. A Memorandum of Clarification was filed on behalf of 
Stilling, advising the court that despite the prior pleading titles 
and designations, the matter pending should be considered a Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Pleas and should therefore be restyled as such. 
Subsequent pleadings contained both the case number given the 
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Petition and the original district court numbers in which the 
guilty pleas were entered. The Notice of Appeal designated all 
four case numbers. 
11. The hearing on the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty 
Pleas was held on October 9, 1991, at which time the court denied 
the motion. 
12. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
proposed by the state. Objections were filed by counsel for 
Stilling. The court adopted the state's findings and conclusions, 
entering its order on February 7, 1992. (Addendum C.) 
13. Through oversight, the court failed to notify the 
parties of the entry of its order. On March 16, 1992, the court 
entered a Notice of Entry of Findings and Order, beginning the 
thirty day appeal period. 
14. On March 17, 1992, Stilling filed his Notice of 
Appeal in Case No. 16269, 16271, 16272, and 900902323. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Stilling was charged with four counts of Aggravated 
Robbery, felonies of the first degree, and one count of being a 
Habitual Criminal and arraigned on those charges on August 31, 
1984, before the Hon. Ronald 0. Hyde, who had the clerk read aloud 
to Stilling the Informations filed in the cases. (R. 95 of the 
original criminal files (hereinafter "OCF"), as distinguished from 
the 1990 Writ file.) 
2. On February 13,1985, Second Amended Informations 
charging Stilling with three counts of Robbery, felonies of the 
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second degree, were filed in three of the four cases in the 
district court before Judge Hyde. At Stilling's arraignment that 
same day on those charges, the Second Amended Informations were not 
read by the clerk or by the judge to Stilling. (R. 144-145 OCF) 
3. To those three counts of robbery Stilling pled 
guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970), 
under which Stilling maintained his innocence while pleading 
guilty, in order to accept a favorable plea bargain. (R. 146-147 
OCF) 
4. At that arraignment and entry of guilty pleas, no 
one presented to the court any factual basis to support the taking 
of those pleas. The court made no inquiry regarding the factual 
basis for the pleas and neither the prosecutor nor the defense 
attorney proffered what facts could support a finding of guilt in 
any of the cases. (R. 147-150 OCF) 
5. Paragraph 8 (e) of the Expiation Agreement, aka 
Guilty Plea Affidavit, prepared by Bernie Allen acknowledged that 
Stilling maintained his innocence. (R 264 OCF) 
6. The court made no findings on the record regarding 
Stilling fs understanding of the nature of his pleas nor of the 
voluntariness of those pleas. (R. 147-150 OCF) 
7. The court never signed the Order regarding the 
voluntariness of Stilling1s pleas, leaving the signature line 
blank. (R. 266 OCF) 
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8. Minimum time for sentencing was waived and on that 
same date Stilling was sentenced to three indeterminate terms of 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, where he remains. 
9. An appeal was taken in 1985 on issues unrelated to 
the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Please; the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A, THE STATE MAY NOT RECTIFY AT A LATER HEARING THE 
INSUFFICIENCY IN THE TAKING OF GUILTY PLEAS SO AS TO OVERCOME THE 
SUBSTANTIAL LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHERE THE INSUFFICIENCY IS THE FAILURE TO 
ESTABLISH THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE TAKING OF THE GUILTY PLEAS. 
The lower court concluded that if it were bound by the 
record made at the time Judge Hyde took the guilty pleas, it would 
find that there was not substantial compliance with Rule 11. 
However, Judge Roth found that the contemporaneous record could be 
supplemented seven years later by an affidavit that satisfied the 
requirement of the existence of a factual basis to support the 
taking of guilty pleas seven years earlier and defeat a motion to 
withdraw those guilty pleas. Stilling claims that while some 
minor deficiencies surrounding the taking of guilty pleas may be 
subsequently rectified, the failure to establish on the record at 
the time of the taking of the guilty plea the facts which the state 
relies upon to support the charges made is not an error that can be 
corrected later and applied retroactively. 
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B. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE 
RECORD TO ESTABLISH A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE TAKING OF A GUILTY PLEA 
IS PERMITTED, AN AFFIDAVIT OF THE DEFENDANT'S LAWYER FILED OVER THE 
OBJECTION OF THE CLIENT, MAY NOT BE USED TO FILL THE VOID IN THE 
RECORD. 
Upon request of the state and without subpoena, order of 
the court, or permission of the client, Stillingfs lawyer prepared 
a lengthy affidavit to be used by the state against Stilling, to 
whom he still owed a duty of confidentiality and a duty to not use 
information acquired from his client in a manner adverse to him. 
Those duties arise under the Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
statutory protection of the attorney-client privilege. It was 
clear error for Judge Roth to consider and rely upon that affidavit 
to find that it sufficiently supplemented the record so that the 
1985 taking of the guilty pleas was now through evidence created 
and acquired in 1991 in substantial compliance with Rule 11. 
C. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO DENY STILLING1 S MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS. 
Where the contemporaneous record of the taking of the 
guilty pleas in 1984 did not substantially comply with Rule 11 
because the court failed to make an inquiry about the factual basis 
supporting the pleas and the prosecution did not proffer such 
facts, the only appropriate remedy is the granting of the 
defendant's motion to withdraw those improperly taken pleas. 
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VI• ARGUMENT 
A. THE STATE MAY NOT RECTIFY AT A LATER HEARING THE 
INSUFFICIENCY IN THE TAKING OF GUILTY PLEAS IN ORDER TO OVERCOME 
THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHERE THE INSUFFICIENCY IS THE FAILURE TO 
ESTABLISH THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE TAKING OF THE GUILTY PLEAS. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
the framework for the taking of traditional guilty pleas in which 
a defendant admits the elements of the crime.1 Inherent in that 
process is an exchange between the court and the accused through 
which the court advises the accused of his several constitutional 
rights that shall be waived upon entry of a plea of guilty, sets 
out the elements of the crime, and determines whether the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered and is an admission of the 
elements of the crime. State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 1987) 
further refined the obligations of the court in the plea taking 
process and set the standard of compliance with Rule 11. State v. 
Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah 1991) clarified the standard of 
compliance for guilty pleas taken pre-Gibbons, holding that 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest, and may not accept the plea until the court has 
found: 
• • • 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of 
the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
9 
substantial compliance, not strict compliance, is required for 
those pleas to withstand a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
Non-traditional guilty pleas, such as Alford pleas or 
pleas of guilty and mentally ill, require supplemental inquiries. 
With the latter plea the trial court must satisfy itself by 
conversations with the defendant and with counsel that although the 
defendant is mentally ill, he or she is sufficiently competent to 
knowingly enter such a plea. With the former the court must 
satisfy itself that facts exist upon which a conviction could be 
obtained because the nature of a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. 
Alford, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970) is that the defendant maintains his 
innocence while pleading guilty. Stilling's guilty pleas were 
Alford pleas. 
The need to establish on the record the factual basis to 
support a guilty plea arises from the constitutional protections 
of the accused and the presumption of innocence. There is no 
societal value in coercing fearful but innocent defendants into 
pleading guilty. As articulated in Alford: 
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent 
and of insuring that guilty pleas are a product of free 
and intelligent choice, various state and federal court 
decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims 
of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a 
factual basis for the plea...(citations omitted); and 
until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and 
sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of 
trial and the claim of innocence. (Citations omitted.) 
91 S.Ct. at 167-168, footnote 10. 
Consequently, in cases involving Alford pleas, the court must 
receive a proffer from one of the parties, typically the 
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prosecutor, regarding what its evidence would be that would sustain 
a guilty verdict; or alternatively, as in Alford, the court must 
hear testimony from a police officer or other witnesses that 
likewise establish the elements of the crime. These procedures, in 
conjunction with other Rule 11 requirements, give the court 
assurances that the plea is knowing and voluntary, and that there 
are facts that would likely support a conviction, essential 
features of any valid guilty plea. 
Given the facts that in the instant case the trial judge 
neither read the Amended Informations to Stilling nor discussed 
with him the elements of those offenses nor had any person—lawyer 
or witness—indicate what facts supported the charges nor made any 
findings regarding the knowing or voluntary nature of the pleas, 
Judge Roth found that the record made at the time of the taking of 
Stillingfs guilty pleas did not demonstrate substantial compliance 
with Rule 11: 
At the time the plea was taken by Judge Hyde on the 
issue of Rule 11 specifically, the issue of whether he 
convinced himself that the Defendant understood the 
elements of the crime and how the facts related to it, he 
was not in substantial compliance with Rule 11. And to 
the extent that North Carolina v. Alford requires that 
the Court determine there is a factual basis for entering 
the plea, the evidence is very slim. T. 43 
That critical finding by Judge Roth has not been challenged by the 
state. 
Having made that finding, however, Judge Roth, in 
reliance on Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) ruled that 
the state could supplement the record that existed in 1985 with new 
testimony that would become part of "the record as a whole"; and if 
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that newly created record as a whole erased the deficiencies, 
Stillingfs motion to withdraw his guilty pleas would be denied. 
(R.163-164) Stilling contends that the court's reliance on Jolivet 
is misplaced and that supplementation of the record was error. 
The trial court in Jolivet failed to make findings 
regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty pleas, 
including the possibility of consecutive sentences. In a 
subsequent hearing before a different district court judge, to 
determine whether Jolivet should be permitted to withdraw his 
guilty pleas, the court reviewed the record as a whole, as it 
existed at the time of the guilty pleas, and concluded that the 
guilty plea were knowingly and voluntarily made, and that the 
defendant understood that consecutive sentences might be imposed. 
Jolivet!s pleas were traditional guilty pleas, not Alford pleas. 
In his review of the record, the court noted that at the 
time of the entry of the guilty pleas, "the judge read the charges 
and had the facts relating to those charges stated. The judge then 
asked Jolivet if the factual situations relating to the crimes 
charged were fairly and fully stated. Jolivet answered in the 
affirmative.11 784 P. 2d at 1149. Regarding the matter of 
consecutive sentences, the court found that at the first 
arraignment on the charges, the judge told Jolivet that the court 
could impose consecutive or concurrent sentences and asked Jolivet 
if he understood those possibilities. Jolivet indicated that he 
did. Consequently, the court found that the guilty pleas were 
knowingly and voluntarily made, with full knowledge of the 
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possibility of consecutive sentences. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the denial of Jolivetfs motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas. 
The "record as a whole" considered by the lower court and 
by the appellate court was the record of the case as it existed at 
the time of the taking of the guilty pleas. No additional 
testimony was received. Therefore, in the instant case Judge 
Roth's reliance on Jolivet was misplaced; while Jolivet was 
entitled to a hearing on a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, he 
was not entitled to enlarge the record as a whole that was under 
consideration. 
Stilling!s claim that the "record as a whole" refers to 
the record that existed at the time of the taking of the entry of 
the plea and not to a supplemented record created seven years after 
the entry of the guilty plea is further supported by State v. 
Breckenridge, 688 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983) , which found that the 
record at the time of the taking of the plea demonstrated that 
Breckenridgefs guilty plea was uninformed and involuntary. In 
reversing the lower court's denial of Breckenridge's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the court stated that "the record recites 
no factual basis from which we might conclude that an arson ever 
occurred." 688 P.2d at 443. 
In its opening paragraph the court succinctly captured 
the issue: 
The dispositive question is whether a conviction 
based on a plea may stand where there is no record of 
facts showing that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant, or that the defendant has for 
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some other legitimate reason intelligently and 
voluntarily entered such a plea. See North Carolina v. 
Alford. We reverse. (Citation omitted.) 
The issue was decided upon the state of the record as it existed at 
the time of the taking of the guilty plea. 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit reached the conclusion urged 
by Stilling in United States v. Keiswetter, 866 F.2d 1301 (10th 
Cir. 1989). Although protesting his innocence Keiswetter entered 
a plea of guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford to the crime 
of conversion. He timely moved to withdraw his plea; such motion 
was denied. On appeal the panel concluded that "the record failed 
to demonstrate that the plea was properly accepted in the first 
instance because of the absence of evidence of a factual basis for 
the plea", citing Fed. R. Crim P. 11(f).2 866 F.2d at 1302. It 
initially remanded the case to the district court to give that 
judge a chance to clarify his reasons for having made a finding 
that a factual basis existed for the charge to which Mr. Keiswetter 
pled guilty. United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d. 992 (10th Cir. 
1988) . 
In a strong dissent Judge John Moore objected to the 
remand, stated that the plea was invalid, and that "allowing the 
trial court the opportunity to revitalize it is a post hoc 
disposition that is unparalleled in our jurisprudence." 860 F.2d at 
2
 Fed. R. Crim P. 11 (f) provides: "Notwithstanding the 
acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a 
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall 
satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." There is no 
comparably explicit Utah rule, which has acknowledged this 
requirement by case law. 
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998. He discussed the two aspects of an Alford plea: the first 
requires the judge to determine the voluntariness of the plea, that 
is, that the defendant understands what he is doing, what rights he 
is waiving, and what the consequences may be; the second requires 
that the court be presented evidence at the taking of the plea that 
strongly suggests the guilt of the accused. "Without such strong 
evidence, refusal to permit the withdrawal of the plea would result 
in the anachronism of forcing a conviction to stand without 
evidence of guilt." 860 F.2d. at 998. 
On a rehearing en banc Judge Moore got to write the 
majority opinion, all but one of his colleagues having concluded 
that his earlier dissenting opinion was correct. The Court of 
Appeals reversed the judgement of the district court and remanded 
the case with instructions to vacate the Keiswetter's plea of 
guilty. 
In the instant case there is no case law that authorized 
the lower court to permit the state a chance to rehabilitate and 
supplement the record and to create substantial compliance with 
Rule 11 six years after the taking of the pleas. Under these 
circumstances, vacating the guilty pleas is the only remedy. 
B. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT SUPPLEMENTATION OP THE 
RECORD IS ALLOWED, IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT THE USE OF AN AFFIDAVIT 
OF STILLINGfS OWN LAWYER IN THE ATTEMPT TO CORRECT THE 
DEFICIENCIES. 
At the request of the prosecutor and without consultation 
with or consent of Stilling, the lawyer who represented Stilling in 
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1985 filed a lengthy affidavit with the court, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum 3. Bernie Allen did so without a court 
order directing him to give testimony; he did so without a subpoena 
have been served upon him to coerce testimony; and he did so in 
utter disregard of or indifference to his duty of confidentiality 
to his client, a duty that is at the center of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and which separately is owed under Utah 
statutes that protect privileged communications. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-24-8 (1953 as amended) prefaces its 
enumeration of statutory privileges with this language: "There are 
particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to 
encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate.11 It then sets 
out at (2) the attorney-client privilege: "An attorney cannot, 
without the consent of his client, be examined as to any 
communication made by the client to him or his advice given 
regarding the communication in the course of his professional 
employment." 
The privilege is the client's, not the lawyer's. It is 
the client's to waive or not to waive. The court's findings cite 
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888) as the precedent for the 
proposition that Stilling waived his attorney-client privilege with 
Bernie Allen. Blackburn is a real estate case, in which the 
defendant reported communications between herself and her attorney 
and claimed that he had deceived, misled, and misadvised her in the 
matter which had resulted in a lawsuit against her. The Court held 
that once Mrs. Blackburn had voluntarily revealed what she claimed 
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were the secret communications between her lawyer and her, she 
could not prevent the lawyer from providing testimony regarding 
those same conversations. The Blackburn case has no relevance to 
the instant case and Judge Roth erred in being misled by the 
prosecutor in the matter of the attorney-client privilege. 
Stilling never disclosed in any pleading any confidential 
communications he had with Bernie Allen so Allen's affidavit is not 
analogous to the circumstances in Blackburn. 
Furthermore, with Blackburn's irrelevancy, the issue 
surrounding Allen's affidavit is identifying some other 
confidentiality exception which would justify its publication. 
There is none. There is no rule of criminal law that holds that 
whenever a defendant alleges his appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to raise the issue of non-compliance with Rule 11 that 
the allegedly ineffective lawyer is permitted to turn against the 
client and use confidential communications and subjective 
impressions about his client to defeat the ineffectiveness claim. 
In fact, the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct jealously 
protect attorney-client secrets and have adopted a more stringent 
rule than the model rule upon which it is based. The Utah Rule 1.6 
provides in pertinent part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating 
to representation of a client except as stated in 
paragraph (b) , unless the client consents after 
disclosure.... (b) A lawyer may reveal such information 
to the extent the lawyer believes necessary: ... (3) To 
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in 
a controversy between the lawyer and the client or to 
establish a claim against the lawyer based upon conduct 
in which the client was involved;" 
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The Model Rule adds this language to the above-cited 
provision: 
...or to respond to allegations in any proceeding 
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client. 
The Utah Supreme Court declined to adopt that broader language, 
preferring to restrict the opportunities for disclosure of client 
confidences. Consequently, Mr. Allen, who was unwisely both trial 
and appellate counsel, ought not have filed his affidavit in this 
matter. 
However, whether or not appellate counsel was ineffective 
became a moot issue in this case, so whatever mistakenly claimed 
basis there was for its submission disappeared. When the 
undersigned entered this case on behalf of Stilling, she recognized 
that Stilling fs plea was entered prior to the enactment of the 
statute that limits the time period for filing a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea. The court was advised that the matter to be decided 
was really such a motion and was not properly a petition for post-
conviction or habeas relief. The prosecution acknowledged that the 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim had been abandoned. (T. 2-3,11) 
In addition to violating the above-cited statutory 
provision and Rule 1.6, Mr. Allen's affidavit also violated Rule 
1.9, which provides in pertinent part: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a 
matter shall not thereafter: 
...(b) Use information relating to the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former client 
except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a client 
or when the information has become generally known. 
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When Mr. Allen testified via affidavit, he provided information 
that became the essential basis relied upon by Judge Roth for 
denying his former client's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. 
See Findings of Fact attached (T. 44): 
...I am allowing that Affidavit of Mr. Allen. And 
I believe that his statements concerning discussions 
about the elements of the crime, and his discussions 
about the facts, where he suggests that he reviewed in 
great detail the police report, the witnessesfs 
statements, and had discussions with his client, and it 
was their opinion that there was very little chance of 
winning on the facts had they gone to trial, but he 
thought he had some issues he could prevail on appeal. 
That coupled with the expiation statement, which is to 
the same effect, satisfied North Carolina Vs. Alvord 
(sic). 
Ignoring for a moment the fact that drafting and filing 
the affidavit was contrary to law and to the ethical standards that 
govern our profession, the Allen affidavit still did not provide 
the factual basis required for a valid plea. Allen's affidavit 
only went to the state of mind of Stilling, including his 
perception of the strength of the evidence, the risk of loss at 
trial, and his awareness of the consequences of the plea. It was 
the second part of a valid Alf ord plea that was missing, and 
Allen's affidavit could not and did not fill that void: the 
establishment in the presence of and for the benefit of the judge 
and the accused the factual basis for the pleas—the enunciation of 
the evidence that would have supported verdicts of guilt. 
The preparation, use, and acceptance of the 
affidavit of the lawyer who represented Stilling at his guilty 
pleas and who thereafter did his appeal (on other issues), where 
such affidavit was barred by the attorney-client privilege and the 
19 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and was prepared for a claim 
that was withdrawn by Stilling, was a serious error. 
The error was aggravated by the fact that the contents 
of the affidavit considered only the voluntariness of the plea— 
that Stilling knew that it was in his best interest to accept the 
negotiated settlement and plea—when from the first post-conviction 
motion filed in this case by Stilling the claims had been that: 
[t]he judge at sentencing did not comply with Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in that: (a) 
The Judge failed to ask each of the appropriate 
questions, nor did the Judge determine that there was a 
factual basis for the plea. 
(R.002) 
Voluntariness was not the issue although Judge Roth 
seemed unable to separate the voluntariness prong from the factual 
basis prong. 
C. WHERE THE RECORD MADE AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING OF 
AN ALFORD PLEA DEMONSTRATES A LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH 
RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BY FAILING TO 
ESTABLISH THE FACTS THAT COULD SUPPORT A VERDICT OF GUILT, THE ONLY 
REMEDY IS VACATION OF THE GUILTY PLEAS. 
At one point in the hearing in the court below, the judge 
observed that the case "is kind of a bucket of worms at this 
point." (T.25) He attempted an ad hoc, crazy-quilt remedy, 
admitting that he wasn't sure how Hoff and Jolivet interplay and 
affect Stilling and puzzled about Alford's implications. (T. 20, 
26, 27, 30, 36, 43, 44). He was sure that in 1985 Judge Hyde had 
not substantially complied with Rule 11 and the 1985 record 
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conclusively demonstrates that the court never established the 
factual basis for the pleas in any of the three cases. The 
colloquy with Stilling went only to Stilling1s understanding of 
what he was doing; the court ignored the equally important issue of 
satisfying itself that there was a set of facts that would likely 
support a conviction in these cases. That defect is not capable of 
repair. For reasons set forth in Keiswetter the only remedy is 
vacation of the pleas. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth above, Stilling urges this court to 
reverse the judgment of the lower court, vacate the pleas of 
guilty, and remand these cases to the trial court to undertake 
further proceedings upon Stilling*s pleas of not guilty to the 
original charges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *7 day of September, 
1992. 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER: 
Jo 'Carol Nesset-Sale 
Attorney for Appellant 
M^^  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of September, 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, David B. 
Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, 6100 South 300 East, Suite 




Petition for Post Conviction Relief to Set Aside Guilty Plea, 
filed August 28, 1990 
0 0 4 1 1 3 
&CTCOMT 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING 
Attorney Pro Se 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant. 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
TO SET ASIDE GUILTY 
PLEA 
Case No. % & & & 3 <i9 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, and for 
cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. A committment order was issued on the January or 
February of 1965 by the Honorable Judge Hyde, Judge of the 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah which hz\6 charged 
Petitioner with three charges: 16269, 16271, 16272. 
2. That Petitioner was sentenced to a term of one to 
fifteen, after making an Alfred plea. 
3. That Petitioner appealed the sentence on the basis of 
the Interstate Detainer Act, to the Utah Supreme Court, which was 
affirmed in 1987. 
4. That Petitioner is currently located at the Utah State 
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Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 64020. 
5. That Petitioner's restraint is unlawful and 
unconstitutional in that: The Judge at sentencing did not comply 
with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure in that: 
a. The Judge failed to ask each of the appropriate 
questions, nor did the Judge determine that there was a factual 
basis for the plea. 
b. That these matters have not been previously ruled upon 
by this court or by any other court. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule a hearing at which time Petitioner may be 
represented. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed 
without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments. 
3. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist 
in the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated 
above. 
4. Issue a Petition for Post Conviction Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be 
discharged from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and 
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restraint. 
DATED this J' J>._ day of [/^ c^ c^ ct.«s t > 1990. 
Steven Michael Stilling 
Attorney Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoinq Petition fo-r Post Conviction Relief, postage 
prepaid, to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 64114, this _J_5L d^y of 
Jkv*st*<&fc * 1390 
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ADDENDUM B 
Affidavit of Bernard L. Allen, filed June 13, 1991 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
300 East 6100 South, Suite #204 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 2 65-5638 
JUN 1 3 1991 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF WEBER 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Petitioner, : BERNARD L. ALLEN 
vs. : 
STATE OF UTAH, Utah Department: Case No, 900902323 HC 
of Corrections, : 
Respondent. : Judge David E. Roth 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
COMES NOW, BERNARD L. ALLEN, being duly sworn upon his 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of 
Utah and was so in 1985. 
2. In 1985 I was, and still am, an attorney with the lav; 
firm of Richards, Caine & Allen in Ogden, Utah. I was trial 
counsel at that time for the Petitioner in the above captioned 
matter as a contract attorney for the Weber County Public 
Defenders Association and have personal knowledge of the matters 
addressed in this Affidavit. 
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3. That Petitioner was charged with four (4) First Degree 
Aggravated Robberies, penalties of five (5) years to life; a 
Habitual Criminal Enhancement with a penalty of five (5) years 
to life and a one (1) to five (5) year enhancement for use of a 
firearm. 
4. Through plea negotiations, an offer was presented to 
the Petitioner, which he accepted, consisting of three (3) 
Second Degree Robberies with penalties of one (1) to fifteen 
(15) years. The fourth Aggravated Robbery and all of the 
enhancements were dismissed. 
5. I had an opportunity to discuss this case with 
Petitioner at great length. Unlike many of the clients I was 
representing at that time, I found the Petitioner to be very 
bright and very knowledgeable regarding the criminal justice 
system. 
6. I thought that his cases presented interesting and 
potentially winnable issue for appeal, whereas both the 
Petitioner and I felt that the prospects of actually winning a 
trial on any of the four (4) cases, based on the fact situation, 
was very slim indeed. 
7. I had an opportunity in my representation of the 
Petitioner to review in great detail the police reports, witness 
statements regarding the offenses and I made a very strong 
argument to the Deputy County Attorney regarding his position on 
the potential issue for appeal and I though that the plea 
negotiation was extremely favorable under the circumstances of 
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the facts and evidence that they had against the Petitioner on 
the original charges. 
8. The Petitioner was very much in agreement regarding the 
value of the plea negotiation, knowing that he had little, if 
any, chance of winning the Aggravated Robbery cases had we gone 
to Trial. 
9. As I recall, the Petitioner's record was not good and 
we understood from the outset that his sentence would involve 
Prison. 
10. We discussed the elements of Aggravated Robbery at 
great length and attempted to examine them in detail in an 
effort to find a factual basis for escaping conviction. 
11. I found the Petitioner to be extremely helpful in 
reviewing the evidence and the law and would categorize him as 
a better than average jailhouse lawyer. 
12. When the County Attorney's Office went along with the 
plea negotiation, we did discuss in detail the elements of the 
reduced pleas, in particular the fact that it was still a 
robbery, but that the reduction had taken out any mention of any 
type of weapon. This of course was extremely important to the 
Petitioner because it removed the sentencing enhancements that 
would have accompanied convictions on the Aggravated Robberies 
because of the use of a firearm in those robberies. 
13. At the time of the entry of the plea, the actual 
elements of the robberies were not a grave issue, because 
although Petitioner was pleading guilty and understood fully 
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that he would be sentenced and dealt with by the Courts at 
sentencing as though this were an unconditional guilty plea, the 
Petitioner indicated on the record that he was not specifically 
admitting any guilt to any specific elements of any offense, but 
was accepting the plea negotiation to greatly reduce his 
exposure to penalty in the cases and to ripen the matter for 
appeal. 
14. Therefore, although the elements of the offense of 
robbery were discussed in detail with the Petitioner by myself 
and the Amended Informations given to him which he read 
thoroughly, the actual offense that he plead to was not really 
that important to him. The main importance to the Petitioner at 
the time was that the penalties were one (1) to fifteen (15) 
potential years in Prison, rather than five (5) to life, plus 
enhancements and that he reserve the issues that he felt were 
important for an appeal. 
15. As I was the attorney representing the Petitioner also 
on appeal, I did have an opportunity to review the record, but 
again the specific elements of the offense of robbery were well 
within the grasp and understanding of the Petitioner and he 
verbally acknowledged to me, on numerous occasions, that he 
understood what he was doing. 
16. The elements of the offense again were not 
particularly important to the appeal either, because frankly the 
charges could have been reduced to any Second Degree Felony, 
because it was really the potential penalty that was of 
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importance to the Petitioner and not the specific offense. 
17. It was my understanding at the time of the entry of 
plea and in reviewing the case as well, that the Petitioner was 
not specifically admitting to any elements of any criminal 
offense, but was agreeing to accept the penalty regardless of 
that in an effort to reduce his exposure. 
18. This was not a case which unfortunately can some times 
happen where the actual time spent with the Petitioner is 
relatively minimal. This Petitioner demanded and because of my 
interest in the case, I acquiesced to numerous lengthy meetings 
with the Petitioner regarding the facts of the case, the 
potential for appeal and the eventual plea negotiation. 
19. In those meetings the Petitioner made it clear to me 
that he fully and completely understood the facts of the case 
against him and the elements of the crimes with which he was 
charged and the elements of the crime that he plead to in the 
negotiation. 
20. Finally, in reviewing the statement by Petitioner in 
advance of plea, Petitioner took an active part in the wording 
of that Expiation Agreement and then reviewed it with me 
personally, initialing each of the paragraphs expressing an 
understanding of the contents of the document. 
21. In conclusion, I found the Petitioner to be a 
fascinating individual to talk to and a person with a surprising 
amount of sophistication regarding the workings of the criminal 
justice system and found him to be extremely helpful in 
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reviewing the facts and the evidence in the case and posturing 
the matter for appeal. There is no question in my mind that he 
fully understood what he was doing in entering the plea and 
absolutely no question that if he had not understood any aspect 
of the process that he would have grilled me with questions 
until he did fully understand. 
22. In spite of the Petitionees difficulties, I developed 
genuine affection for him and wish him the best of absolute luck 
in his future. This is my best recollection of the things that 
transpired in my representation of Petitioner. 
23. Further your Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this /3 day of June, 19^1. 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befo 
1991 
is -7—^^ day of June, 
= % * . 
—"ROTARY PUBLIC i> 
mtm 
fSS-*<z^ 
PAM J. PONTIUS 
*908NOfth1225Easl , 
No Ogdon, ut^f^ R^uf 
Hy CommrssfO i Cvnuus' 
Oct 11, i9i«: : 
STATE OF u> AH | 
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ADDENDUM C 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed February 10, 1992 
•'
 ; !;TV 
. .... i I 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-5638 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
t ^ot i« l 
STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v, : 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, : Case No, 900902323 
Defendant. : Judge David ^L Roth 
Defendant's petition to withdraw his guilty plea came on 
for hearing on October 9, 1991 at 3:01 p.m., before the Honorable 
DavidS£L Roth, Second District Court Judge. Defendant was present 
and represented by Jo Carol Nesset-Sale. Plaintiff was represented 
by David F. Bryant Assistant Attorney General. After hearing 
arguments of counsel and receiving exhibits, and the court being 
fully advised in the premises, the court now enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Defendant was convicted of three 
counts of robbery, all second degree felonies, in the Second 
Judicial District Court, 
2. After entering guilty pleas pursuant to North 
Carolina v. Alford to all three counts, Defendant was sentenced to 
three terms of one to fifteen years, 
3. Defendant is currently incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison in Draper, Utah, 
4. The amended informations to which Defendant plead 
guilty were read and understood by Defendant, and he discussed them 
with his counsel. 
5. Defendant was in possession of copies of the amended 
informations. 
6. Defendant's trial counsel, Bernard Allen, discussed 
the case at length with Defendant, 
7. Bernard Allen discussed the elements of aggravated 
robbery and the elements of the reduced charges of robbery at 
length with Defendant, as well as the proposed plea bargain, 
8. Defendant had a thorough understanding of his case 
and even helped his counsel draft the expiation agreement. 
9. Other than the amended informations, the record does 
not indicate that either the prosecuting attorney or witnesses 
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presented additional evidence to independently establish a factual 
basis for each charge. 
10. Based upon the record as a whole, Defendant's guilty 
plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. 
11. The record as a whole includes evidence received 
pursuant to Defendant's attempt to obtain post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. 
2. The affidavit of Bernard Allen, entered as an exhibit 
in response to Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, is 
part of the record as a whole. Jolivet v. Cook/ 784 P. 2d 1148 
(Utah 1989) . 
3. Despite a lack of substantial compliance with Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11, at the taking of the guilty plea, the State can 
demonstrate that the plea was knowing and voluntary through 
evidence taken as a consequence of a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Jolivet v. Cook. 
4. If the court were to rely only on the record as it 
existed at the time of the pleas, that record would be insufficient 
to establish substantial compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11. 
5. The affidavit of Bernard Allen demonstrates that 
Petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. 
6. If a pre-Gibbons guilty plea is not in substantial 
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compliance with Utah Rule Crim. P. 11, the State may demonstrate 
that the plea was knowing and voluntary through the record as a 
whole. Jolivet v. Cook. 
6. The affidavit of Bernard Allen did not violate the 
attorney/client privilege. The privilege was waived when Defendant 
made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Hunt v. 
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888). 
ORDER 
The above-captioned matter came on for hearing on October 
9, 1991 at 3:01 p.m., before the Honorable David ©L-Roth, Second 
District Court Judge. The court having entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefore, it 
is hereby: 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. That the petition for withdrawal of guilty plea is 
denied. 
DATED t h i s day o f ^ J a n u a r y , / 9 9 2 , 
foifOfeAg£E DAVID '^ JROTH 
Second District Court 
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